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This article examines Southeast Asian regionalism amidst globalization in the 
context of China’s soft power strategy in the region.  This article contends that its 
model of regionalism allows Southeast Asia to cope with the challenges of 
globalization and provides countries in the region a louder and collective voice 
when dealing with major powers like China.  While there seems to be a 
convergence of Southeast Asian regionalism and China’s use of soft power, this 
article identifies some pitfalls that limit  the luster of China’s soft power appeal in 
the region. 
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Introduction 
st century has been described as the age of globalization,2 regions 
have become important objects of study and analysis in contemporary international 
relations.  Western authors argue that “regions are now more salient features of 
international politics.”3  Even mainland Chinese scholars recognize the significance of 
regional studies in the peaceful development efforts of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC).4
Among the regions of the world, Southeast Asia  has attracted global attention 
because of its unique brand of regionalism.  The region is also vital for China’s security 
not only because of geographic proximity but also due to various strategic issues that 
matter to the national interests of PRC like the South China Sea disputes, the Taiwan 
Conflict, maritime security concerns and major power rivalries.  Southeast Asian model 
of regionalism has also made it one of the major subjects of scholarly studies and policy-
   
                                               
1 This article is an updated version of a paper presented at the international conference on  Globalization 
and East Asian Regionalism: Cooperation and Conflict,  organized by the Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Jinan University at Guangzhou, China on March 28, 2009. 
2See John Baylis and Steve Smith (Eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to 
International Relations, 2nd Edition (New York:  Oxford University Press, Inc., 2001). 
3David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (Eds.), Regional Orders:  Building Security in a New World 
(Pennsylvania:  The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 6.  Also see Barry Buzan and Ole 
Waever, Regions and Powers:  The Structure of International Security (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2003) and Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Eds.), Security Communities (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
4Major universities in China already have international relations programs that include regional studies.  
The Beijing-based Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), for example, has the Center for Regional 
Security Studies.  See http://iaps.cass.cn/english/Centers/show_center.asp?assort=CRSS.   Many Chinese 
scholars have already released various publications on regional studies, particularly on Southeast Asia, but 
most of these publications are in Mandarin). 
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making debates in China.5   It is even perceived that “Southeast Asia is the area of the 
world where China’s use of soft power has been most significant.”6
Southeast Asia is well-known for its brand of regionalism that upholds the 
practice of intense dialogues and exhausting consultations to generate consensus on 
contentious issues facing the region. Invented by the five founding fathers of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),  this type of regionalism, honed by a 
long process of leaders’ socialization and inter-state interaction, encourages all ASEAN 
members to cooperate on non-contentious areas through informal and incremental 
approach initially mandated by the Bangkok Declaration of 1967.
  China has, in fact, 
embraced Southeast Asian regionalism as it pursues its soft power strategy. 
This article therefore examines Southeast Asian regionalism amidst globalization 
in the context of China’s soft power strategy in the region.  This article contends that its 
model of regionalism allows Southeast Asia to cope with the challenges of globalization 
and provides countries in the region a louder and collective voice when dealing with 
major powers like China.  While there seems to be a convergence of Southeast Asian 
regionalism and China’s use of soft power, this article identifies some pitfalls that limit  
the luster of China’s soft power appeal in the region. 
 
 
Southeast Asian Regionalism In A Global Age 
7   At the heart of this 
regionalism  called the ASEAN-way is the cardinal principle of non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of member states guaranteed by the 1976 Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia. Though the ASEAN Way of non-interference has 
been criticized for its limitations to actually resolve inter-state disputes in the region,8 
particularly the alleviation of human insecurities in a state ruled by a brutal regime,9 
ASEAN has, nonetheless, prevented the occurrence of inter-state military  confrontations 
that can incite regional instabilities.  Since 1967,  no ASEAN member  has used military 
force against fellow ASEAN because of its  own pacific settlement of regional disputes.  
This prompted security analysts to describe ASEAN as a security community in 
Southeast Asia.10
                                               
5For an excellent reference on Southeast Asian studies in China, see Saw Swee-Hock and John Wong 
(Eds.), Southeast Asian Studies in China (Singapore:  Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007). 
6Carola McGiffert, China’s Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States:  Competition and 
Cooperation in the Developing World (Washington DC:  Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
2009), p. v. 
7For an insider’s account of the evolution and development of ASEAN, see Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast 
Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community:  Insights from the former ASEAN Secretary General (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006).  For an excellent analysis of ASEAN during its earlier years, 
see Frank Frost, “ASEAN Since 1967:  Origins, Evolution and Recent Developments” in Alison 
Broinowski (Ed), ASEAN into the 1990s (London: Macmillan, 1990).  
8For a good discussion on the shortcomings of the ASEAN Way, see Shaun Narine, “ASEAN and the ARF:  
The Limits of the ASEAN Way”, Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 10 (October 1997), pp. 961-978. 
9See Kay Moller, “Cambodia and Burma:  The ASEAN Way Ends Here”, Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 12 
(December 1998), pp. 1087-1104. 
   
10See for example  Nicholas Khoo,  “Deconstructing the ASEAN Security Community: A Review Essay”, 
International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Vol. 4, No. 1 (February 2004), pp. 35-46; Amitav Acharya, “A 
Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia” in his Regionalism and Multilateralism:  Essays on 
Cooperative Security in the Asia Pacific (Singapore:  Eastern University Press by Marshall Cavendish, 
2003), pp. 152-184;  Michael Leifer,  “ASEAN as a Model of a Security Community in, Soesastro, Hadi 
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Despite some limitations of ASEAN as a model of regionalism,11 the ASEAN 
Way remains at the core of security cooperation and conflict management in Southeast 
Asia to date.  The ASEAN Way continues to serve as the overarching principle of 
regional security cooperation and dispute settlement in the region.12  Through the 
ASEAN regionalism,  the association improved the security relations not only among its 
members but also with ASEAN’s dialogue partners.  It even encouraged other Southeast 
Asian states to join ASEAN to take advantage of the opportunities of regional 
cooperation.  ASEAN admitted Brunei as a new member on 7 January 1984 and other 
Southeast Asian states followed suit afterwards.    Though ASEAN was challenged by the 
aftermath of  communist victories in Indochina in 1975, the association strongly waged a 
vigorous diplomatic campaign to manage the problem, particularly the refugee issue.  
ASEAN also faced the challenge of Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.  But ASEAN 
used its diplomatic skills to address this challenge by sponsoring series of dialogues 
hailed as the hallmark of ASEAN regionalism.   ASEAN’s success in managing the 
problem in Indochina  received extensive international recognition.   This made some 
scholars to describe ASEAN as “the third world’s most successful experiment in 
regionalism” and a “diplomatic player capable of intervening on major issue of regional 
security.”13  The success of ASEAN to promote regional security amidst tensions in the 
Indochina encouraged the eventual enlargement of the association in the 1990s.14
The enlargement of ASEAN as a community of ten Southeast Asian states 
occurred in the midst of unprecedented growth of the region’s economies in the 1990s.  It 
was also during this period when China also enjoyed remarkable economic growth 
averaging 9% annually.  Though the 1997 Asian financial crisis challenged the 
enlargement of ASEAN, the association continued to be a model of successful 
  To 
date, all Southeast Asian states, except the newly-proclaimed state of East Timor, are 
ASEAN members. 
                                                                                                                                            
(ed.), ASEAN in a Changed Regional and International Political Economy (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies, 1994), p.129-142; and, N. Ganesan, “Rethinking ASEAN as a Security 
Community in Southeast Asia”, Asian Affairs : An American review, Vol.21, No.4, (Winter 1995) , p.210-
225.  For a analysis of ASEAN security community using theories of international relations, see Rommel 
C. Banlaoi, “Research on ASEAN as a Security Community:  Strengths and Limitations of Realism and 
Constructivism in Southeast Asian Security Studies" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, California, 
USA, Mar 22, 2006) at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p99980_index.html  
11For an excellent discussion on the limits of the ASEAN Way as a model of regionalism, see Michael 
Leifer, “The ASEAN Regional Forum:  Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional Security”, Adelphi Paper, 
No. 320 (London:  Oxford University Press, 1996). 
12Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Security Cooperation and Conflict in Southeast Asia after 9/11:  Constructivism, 
the ASEAN Way and the War on Terrorism” in Amitav Acharya and Lee Lai To (Eds.), Asia in the New 
Millennium (Singapore:  Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004), pp. 32-55 and Indian Ocean Survey, Vol. 1, 
No. 1 (January-June 2005), pp. 49-74. 
13Jeannie Henderson, Reassessing ASEAN, Adelphi Paper No. 328 (London:  International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1999), p. 19. 
14This whole paragraph is culled in Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Philippines and ASEAN at 40:  
Achievements, Challenges and Prospects in Regional Security Cooperation”, translated to Mandarin  at 
Southeast Asian Studies:  An Academic  Journal of Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,  Jinan University, 
China, Vol. 4 (2007).  Also in Rommel C. Banlaoi, The Philippines in the Age of Terror:  National, 
Regional, and Global Security Challenges in the Post-9/11 World (London and New York: CRC 
Press/Routledge and Taylor and Francis, 2009), Chapter 16. 
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regionalism in Asia amidst globalization.15
To deepen and intensify ASEAN regionalism and further improve the 
management of inter-state conflicts in Southeast Asia, ASEAN members  met in Bali, 
Indonesia on 7-8 October 2003 for the 9
   It is very important to note that China helped 
ASEAN to recuperate from the harsh impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis by not 
devaluing its currency.  A year  before the crisis, China became a full-blown ASEAN 
dialogue partner in 1996. 
th ASEAN Summit.  In this summit, ASEAN 
leaders signed the ASEAN Concord II, which adopts the concept of ASEAN Security 
Community (ASC)  to bring security cooperation in Southeast Asia to a “higher plane”.16
The adoption of ASC was a significant landmark in the history of ASEAN 
regionalism as it formally declared an important mechanism to improve security 
cooperation in Southeast Asia.  The ASC is even regarded as one of the most important 
innovations of ASEAN regionalism.
   
17  From an association of states tasked to merely 
promote economic, social, and cultural cooperation, the ASC has allowed ASEAN to  
dramatically metamorphose into a regional grouping that promotes security cooperation 
among its member-states, particularly in the area of defense and military affairs.    
With the signing of the ASEAN Charter in 2007, the ASC became Asian Political 
and Security Community with the creation of the Asian Political and Security Council 
(APSC).  As a result of the ratification of the ASEAN Charter in October 2008 by its ten 
members, ASEAN adopted in March 2009, at the conclusion of the 14th
From the foregoing, ASEAN response to globalization is deeper regionalism 
through improved governance of its institutional structures and by widening the scope of 
regional cooperation encompassing both traditional and non-traditional security issues.
 ASEAN Summit, 
the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, which provides a roadmap and 
timetable for ASEAN to establish the APSC by 2015.   
18 
Its pivotal achievement towards this effort is the ratification of the ASEAN Charter, 
which allows institutional and legal frameworks for ASEAN to deepen regional 
economic integration in the midst of globalization.19
The ASEAN Charter, which establishes ASEAN’s juridical personality as an 
intergovernmental organization,  also provides mechanisms for the private sector,  the 
civil society, media, the academe and policy think-tanks to participate in the process of 
regional community building that is more “people-centered” compared to the present 
   
                                               
15Shinji Yamashita and J.S. Eades (Eds.), Globalization in Southeast Asia: Local, National, and 
Transnational Perspectives (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003). 
16Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (7 October 2003).  
17Rizal Sukma, “Political Development:  A Democracy Agenda for ASEAN?” in Donald K. Emmerson 
(ed), Hard Choices:  Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Singapore and California:  
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2008), 
pp. 135-149.  
18Termsak Chalermpalanupap, “Institutional Reform:  One Charter, Three Communities, Many Challenges” 
in Donald K. Emmerson (ed), Hard Choices:  Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia 
(Singapore and California:  Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-
Pacific Research Center, 2008), pp. 91-134.  
19 Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, “The Challenge of Globalization, Business Interests and Economic Integration in 
ASEAN” in Hiro Katsumata and See Seng Tan (Eds.), People’s ASEAN and Government’s ASEAN, RSIS 
Monograph No. 11 (Singapore:  S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2007), pp.41-49. 
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state of ASEAN regionalism, which is “regime-oriented”.20  Its ultimate objective is to 
establish a region-wide social ownership of the community building process for the 
eventual development of an ASEAN citizenship.  Thus, the ASEAN Charter is “a legally 
binding blueprint for the future of regionalism in Southeast Asia” 21 that aims to realize 
ASEAN vision of a truly caring and sharing society.22
Amidst the deepening and widening of ASEAN regionalism in a global age is the 
utilization of China’s soft power in Southeast Asia.  China’s soft power strategy aims to 
enhance its relations with ASEAN and with individual Southeast Asian states.  An 
analyst calls this strategy as a “charm offensive”, which is anchored on  China’s soft 
power appeal in a global age.
 
 
 
The Global Rise of China’s Soft Power And Southeast Asian Regionalism 
23 Though soft power still lacks conceptual clarity in 
strictest  scholarly standard, there has  been a tremendous upsurge of interest in the use of 
this concept within China’s strategic studies and foreign policy community.24  Scholars 
around the world have, in fact, been lured to examine China’s soft power despite the 
enormous difficulties to define and measure it.25  The Chicago Council on Global Affairs 
even produced the “Soft Power Index” to measure attitudes regarding soft power.26
The idea of soft power as a new subject of discourse in international relations 
originated in 1990 from the seminal work of Joseph Nye.
   
27  In this work, Nye strongly 
questioned the view that American power is in decline  because of “imperial overstretch” 
and other factors.28  He argues that the United States could still wield international 
influence through its abundant soft power.  Nye elaborated his concept of soft power in 
his 2004 book,  Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.29
                                               
20 For further discussion, see Donald Emmerson, “Critical Terms:  Security, Democracy, and Regionalism 
in Southeast Asia” in his edited volume, Hard Choices:  Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in 
Southeast Asia, op. cit, pp. 3-56. 
21 Ibid. p. 34. 
  In this bestselling 
book, Nye described American soft power as: 
22 See ASEAN Vision 2020 at http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm. 
23 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive:  How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World (New Haven 
and London:  Yale University Press, 2007). 
24 Joel Wuthnow, “The Concept of Soft Power in China’s Strategic Discourse”, Issues and Studies, vol. 44, 
no. 2 (June 2008), p. 1. 
25 See for example Frank Vibert, “Soft Power and the Future of International Rule-Making” (Paper 
presented at the International Colloquium „Global Freedom: The Future of International Governance “ 
organized by the Liberal Institute of the Friedrich Neumann Foundation, Potsdam, Germany 9 –11 
November 2007); Jan Melissen, Wielding Soft Power:  The New Public Diplomacy (Amsterdam:  
Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2005); and Richard J. Samuels, “Soft Power in East Asia” 
(Paper presented to a conference on Asia’s Search for a Security Community and American Common 
Sense, Washington DC, 20 October 2004). 
26 Christopher B. Whitney and David Shambaugh, Soft Power in Asia:  Results of a 2008 Multinational 
Survey of Public Opinion (Chicago, USA:  The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2008). 
27 Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York:  Basic Books, 1990). 
28 See for example Donald W. White, The American Century: The Rise and Decline of the United States as 
a World Power (New Haven and London:  Yale University Press, 1999); John Taft, American Power: The 
Rise and Decline of U.S. Globalism, 1918-1988 (New York:  Harper & Row, 1989); and, Paul M. Kennedy, 
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New 
York: Random House, 1987). 
29 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York:  Public Affairs, 2004).   
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…”the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion 
or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, 
political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in 
the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced”.30
Though originally conceptualized to grapple with the “rise and fall” of American 
influence in world politics, soft power is being widely used to describe the rapid rise of 
China as one of the world’s major power.  It is argued that China is using soft power “to 
nurture alliances with developing countries to solidify its position in the World Trade 
Organization, flex its muscles on the world stage and act as a counterbalance to US 
power.”
 
 
31
China’s use of its soft power in Southeast Asia is manifested through “non-
military inducements”  including culture, diplomacy, foreign aid, trade and investment.
  The use of China’s soft power is particularly noticed in Africa, Latin America 
and Southeast Asia. 
32
But was Southeast Asia really charmed by China’s soft power? While there is no 
doubt that China is an attractive country because of its long civilization, rich culture and 
current economic prosperity, Southeast Asia welcomes China’s soft power diplomacy in 
the region not because of China’s “charm” but due to Southeast Asian states’ hedging 
behavior.   Hedging is  “a purposeful act in which a state seeks to insure its long term 
interests by placing its policy bets on multiple counteracting options that are designed to 
offset risks embedded in the international system.”
  
Through its soft power strategy, China is said to have enhanced its influence in Southeast 
Asia.  As a result, Southeast Asia has recently viewed  China as a benign power by 
adopting a more accommodating, non-threatening, and non-coercive foreign policy in the 
region.  China has even embraced ASEAN regionalism to win friends and influence 
leaders in Southeast Asia.   
33
Southeast Asia is hedging with China for pragmatic economic and political 
reasons:  to charm China for  aid, trade and investment  necessary for national economic 
prosperity and to constructively engage China for regional stability.  Though China’s 
foreign aid to Southeast Asia is hard to estimate “due to a lack of data and to the unique 
characteristics of Chinese assistance”, it is observed that China has become one of the 
largest bilateral aid donors in Southeast Asia, particularly in mainland Southeast Asian 
states of Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.
   
34
                                               
30Ibid.  
31 Johannes  Dragsbaek Schmidt, “China’s Soft Power Diplomacy in Southeast Asia”, The Copenhagen 
Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 26 (2008), p. 24. 
32 Thomas Lum, Wayme M. Morrison, and Bruce Vaugh, China’s “Soft Power” in Southeast Asia 
(Washington DC:  Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 4 January 2008). 
33 Kuik Cheng-Chwee, Rising Dragon, Crouching Tigers? Comparing the Foreign Policy  Responses of 
Malaysia and Singapore Toward a Re-emerging China, 1990-2005, BiblioAsia, vol. 3, no. 4 (January 2008), 
p. 4.  
34 Lum, Morrison and Vaugh, China’s “Soft Power” in Southeast Asia, p. 5. 
  Despite the present global economic crisis, 
China-ASEAN trade in 2008 reached US$231.1 billion, which is almost 14% increase 
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over the previous year.35
On 10 March 2009, China deployed its largest and most modern naval  ship, 
Yuzheng 311, to patrol China's exclusive economic zone and strengthen fishery 
   China is one of the ten major sources of ASEAN foreign direct 
investment, which totaled around US$2.3 billion in 2007.  China and ASEAN are 
enhancing their relations on the investment area through the China-ASEAN Expo and the 
China ASEAN Business and Investment Summit.  China and ASEAN are active 
participants in the East Asia Summit (EAS), which aims to bring the economies of China 
and Southeast Asia more integrated along with other participants.  China and ASEAN are 
also strategically engaged through the China-ASEAN Dialogue Partnership mechanism, 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).  
Southeast Asia’s hedging strategy with China is an expression of ASEAN’s 
limited-bandwagoning practice in recognition of China’s growing comprehensive power.  
As part of its hedging strategy, ASEAN states are also soft-balancing China by engaging 
other major powers, particularly the United States, Japan and India through its dialogue 
partnership frameworks and other multilateral mechanisms. 
In other words,  Southeast Asia has improved its relationship with China as part 
of ASEAN’s hedging behavior.  It  allowed China’s influence in the region in order to 
reduce the risk of China’s growing comprehensive national power.   Rather than being 
charmed by China’s soft power, Southeast Asia has, in fact, charmed China through the 
ASEAN model of regionalism, which China has recently embraced because it converges 
with the PRC’s soft power strategy.  ASEAN’s commitment to the principle of non-
interference to the domestic affairs of other states coincides with China’s non-
intervention principle.  Thus, China acceded to TAC in 2003 because of non-interference 
or non-intervention principle.   
ASEAN’s diplomacy of incrementalism is also consistent with China’s gradualist 
foreign policy.  China finds this diplomacy “charming” as it bides time to peaceful 
development.  ASEAN’s  protracted and “brick-by-brick” approach to regional 
cooperation is appealing to China’s  “step-by-step” approach based on the old saying, 
“single step in a thousand mile journey.”  
   
  
Pitfalls of China’s Soft Power Appeal in Southeast Asia 
China’s soft power strategy has encouraged Southeast Asia to constructively and 
comprehensively engage the PRC.  But there are pitfalls in China’s use of soft power.  
Sources of these pitfalls emanate from the still unresolved security issues that bedevil the 
relationship between China and Southeast Asian states.   
One major issue is the South China dispute, which is currently heating up because 
of baselines controversies.  Though China has signed the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties on the South China Sea with claimant states in Southeast Asia as part of its soft 
power strategy, the PRC continues to use its hard power to assert its territorial claims in 
the disputed area.    
                                               
35 Gao Chuan and Zhang Yongxing, “Interview: Chinese Ambassador to Singapore: China, ASEAN need to 
enhance co-op to tackle economic downturn”, China View, 4 March 2009 at  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/04/content_10941499.htm.  (accessed on 7 May 2010). 
Article: Rommel C. Banlaoi 
 
  
Jebat  Volume 37 (2010) Page | 62  
administration in the South China Sea.36
The deployment of Yuzheng 311 to the South China Sea was an indication of 
China’s readiness to use its growing hard power when issue of sovereignty is at stake.
  The deployment of this ship to the South China 
Sea was in reaction to the US Navy surveillance ship, Impeccable, which according to 
Chinese officials, were navigating illegally in China’s territorial waters.  
The ship deployment, however, alarmed, rather than charmed, Southeast Asia, 
particularly the claimant states.  It coincided at a time when the Philippines just passed its 
archipelagic baselines law declaring some parts of the Spratlys  as integral part of its 
territory.  China vehemently denounced the Philippine archipelagic baselines law and 
declared Philippine claim as “illegal” and “invalid.”   
37   
Despite the  general improvement of China-Southeast Asia relations in the post-9/11 era, 
“issues of sovereignty continue to hit a raw nerve in the ASEAN capitals” and this limit 
the effectiveness of China’s soft power strategy in the region.38
In 2007, tensions occurred between China and Vietnam over the issue of Sansha 
island in the South China Sea.  The PRC State Council declared Sansha as part of the 
province of Hainan.  Vietnam protested, but to no avail as China reiterated its territorial 
rights and stressed its sovereign power to use force to protect its territories.
   
In fact, China expressed cognizance of the importance of hard power to advance 
its national interests when it increased its defense budget in 2009 to almost 15%, which 
amounts to US$70 billion.  Though this budget is still small compared to the national 
defense budget of the US, Japan and the European Union, it gave signal to the world and 
the countries of Southeast Asia that China also pays attention to its hard power resources.  
Moreover, China’s increase of the defense budget occurred in the midst of global 
financial crisis.  This conveys a strong message that China also wants to enhance its hard 
power despite the present global economic turmoil.   
China’s use of soft and hard powers at the same time is evident in PRC’s 
ambivalent relations with Vietnam and the Philippines.   
China used its soft power when it entered into agreement with Vietnam and the 
Philippines in 2005 on the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) in the South China 
Sea.  But the JMSU failed to effectively ameliorate the security dilemma in the South 
China Sea.  While the JMSU aimed to reduce tensions in the area through joint research, 
it failed to prevent misunderstanding among the contracting parties.    
39
In 2008, another tension occurred in the South China involving the Philippines 
and China on the JMSU issue.  Oppositions claimed that the JMSU was a “sell-out” of 
Philippine territory in exchange of Chinese aid.  The issue created a huge national 
scandal in the Philippines prompting the Philippine government to scrap China-funded 
projects in the country particularly the National Broadband Network (NBN) project 
   
                                               
36 The Associated Press, “China sends large patrol boat to South China Sea”, The International Herald 
Tribune, 15 March 2009 at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2009/03/15/asia/AS-China-Sea-Patrols.php. 
(accessed on 7 May 2010).   
37There is even a view in the Philippines that China has revived its “gunboat” diplomacy in the South China 
Sea. 
38Ian Storey, “Conflict in the South China Sea: China’s Relations with Vietnam and the Philippines”, Japan 
Focus, 30 April 2008 at http://www.japanfocus.org/products/topdf/2734.  (accessed on 7 May 2010) 
39For an excellent analysis of this case, see Ian Storey, “Trouble and Strife in the South China Sea: Vietnam 
and China”, China Brief, vol 8, no. 8 (14 April 2008). 
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worth US$329.5 million. Even the North Luzon Railway (NorthRail) project, worth 
US$503 million, was put on uncertain ground because of the JMSU controversy.40
It is argued that the turbulence between China and Vietnam and China and the 
Philippines over the contested  issue of the South China Sea underscored “the limits of 
Beijing’s so-called ‘charm offensive’ in Southeast Asia”.
   
41
But the existence of 
 
Another source of pitfall in China’s use of soft power in Southeast Asia is the 
issue of Taiwan.  As part of  its soft power diplomacy in the region, China generously 
offers foreign aid to Southeast Asia without major conditions. China’s major quid pro 
quo to aid recipients is the strict observance of the “one-China” policy, which excludes 
Taiwan in the global community of sovereign states.  China also encourages  aid 
recipients to support China’s positions in the United Nations.   
China's new underground nuclear submarine base on the 
southern tip of Hainan Island, which is close to vital sea lanes of navigation in Southeast 
Asia,  has raised regional security concerns.  Reports show that the Hainan base can 
accommodate 20 submarines “including a new type of nuclear ballistic missile 
submarine, and future Chinese aircraft carrier battle groups.”42    There is a view that this 
base aims to protect Chinese interests not only in the South China Sea but also in the 
Taiwan Straits.  Analysts argue that the nuclear submarine base underscored Beijing's 
interest in projecting power beyond the Taiwan Strait.43  Chinese security experts even 
emphasized the strategic importance of the Hainan seas in China's projection of its 
influence with a modern naval fleet.44  
                                               
40See Ian Storey,  “Trouble and Strife in the South China Sea: The Philippines and China”, China Brief, vol 
8, no. 9 (28 April 2008).  Also see Renato de Castro, “The Limits of Twenty-First Century Chinese Soft 
Power Statecraft in Southeast Asia:  The Case of the Philippines”, Issues and Studies, vol. 43, no. 4 
(December 2007), pp. 77-116. 
The  Hainan base is an apparent display of 
China’s hard power that complements its soft power diplomacy in Southeast Asia in a 
global age. 
The South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait are pitfalls in China’s soft power 
strategy in Southeast Asia.  These issues are sources of China’s hardening of foreign and 
security policy towards the region.  While China continuously uses its soft power by 
embracing Southeast Asian regionalism to win the hearts and minds of ASEAN states, 
the PRC also employs its hard power resources on issues that touch its national 
sensitivities.  While China’s use of soft power attracts smaller states to cooperate, 
China’s use of hard power causes the security anxieties of ASEAN perpetuating the 
sources of conflicts between China and Southeast Asia.  China’s readiness to use its hard 
power encourages ASEAN states to engage other major powers in order to balance the 
PRC. 
 
 
41Ian Storey,  “Conflict in the South China Sea: China’s Relations with Vietnam and the Philippines”, 
Japan Focus (30 April 2008) at http://www.japanfocus.org/products/topdf/2734. (accessed on 7 May 
2010). 
42“China's new naval base triggers US concerns”, Space War, 12 May 2008 at 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Chinas_new_naval_base_triggers_US_concerns_999.html.  (accessed on 
7 May 2010). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Reuters, “China says US naval ship broke the law”, ABS-CBN News, 10 March 2009 at http://www.abs-
cbnnews.com/world/03/10/09/china-says-us-naval-ship-broke-law. (accessed on 7 May 2010). 
Article: Rommel C. Banlaoi 
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Conclusion 
In a global age, regionalism has become the coping arm of smaller states to 
advance their national and regional interests. ASEAN has a brand of regionalism that 
works not only for its members but also with its dialogue partners.  China has embraced 
Southeast Asian regionalism because it coincides with PRC’s use of soft power 
diplomacy.    
 Contrary to the analysis of some experts, Southeast Asia was not charmed by 
China’s soft power offensive.  Southeast Asia has comprehensively engaged China 
because of ASEAN’s hedging attitude with major powers.  In fact, China was the one 
charmed by ASEAN regionalism as it has proven its worth, despite of some limitations,  
in promoting cooperation and managing conflicts in Southeast Asia. 
 Indeed, China  is using its soft power to win the hearts and minds of its neighbor.  
Because soft power has its own pitfalls, China is also using its hard power to assert its 
sovereignty on sensitive issues.  For China, soft and hard powers are not separate but 
integral parts of its comprehensive national power that Southeast Asian states have to 
grapple with very deeply.  
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